Skills/PyPI/synfig-mcp

synfig-mcp@1.0.6

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Live MCP control of Synfig Studio (native bridge + headless fallback)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher anusara-bemal · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 257Last detonated 18 h ago
$claude mcp add synfig-mcp -- uvx synfig-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SYNFIG_MCP_HTTP_TOKENSYNFIG_MCP_TOKEN_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: SYNFIG_MCP_BACKEND, SYNFIG_MCP_HOST, SYNFIG_MCP_PATH_MAPPING, SYNFIG_MCP_PORT, SYNFIG_MCP_PROFILE, SYNFIG_MCP_STUDIO_PATH, SYNFIG_MCP_WORKSPACE_ROOTS, SYNFIG_STUDIO_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SYNFIG_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN, SYNFIG_MCP_TOKEN_PATH and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx synfig-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/synfig_mcp/doctor.py:132 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/synfig_mcp/backend/launch.py:107 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen([str(exe)], **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/synfig_mcp/http_transport.py:87 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkinner_app = mcp_server.streamable_http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/synfig_mcp/doctor.py:170 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionshint=f"Restrict file permissions to owner-only: chmod 600 {token_path}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/synfig_mcp/backend/detect.py:44 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/synfig_mcp/production/state.py:11 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesThe state is a single ``pipeline_state.json`` inside the production's outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/synfig_mcp/backend/detect.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/synfig_mcp/backend/detect.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/synfig_mcp/http_transport.py:83 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkUsing mcp_server.streamable_http_app guarantees full MCP protocol compatibilityFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for synfig-mcp@1.0.6 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.