synfig-mcp@1.0.6
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Live MCP control of Synfig Studio (native bridge + headless fallback)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SYNFIG_MCP_HTTP_TOKENSYNFIG_MCP_TOKEN_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: SYNFIG_MCP_BACKEND, SYNFIG_MCP_HOST, SYNFIG_MCP_PATH_MAPPING, SYNFIG_MCP_PORT, SYNFIG_MCP_PROFILE, SYNFIG_MCP_STUDIO_PATH, SYNFIG_MCP_WORKSPACE_ROOTS, SYNFIG_STUDIO_PATH- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SYNFIG_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN, SYNFIG_MCP_TOKEN_PATH and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen([str(exe)], **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.inner_app = mcp_server.streamable_http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.hint=f"Restrict file permissions to owner-only: chmod 600 {token_path}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.The state is a single ``pipeline_state.json`` inside the production's outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Using mcp_server.streamable_http_app guarantees full MCP protocol compatibilityFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for synfig-mcp@1.0.6 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.