Skills/PyPI/syia-mcp-survey-2025-x7k9

syia-mcp-survey-2025-x7k9@0.1.17

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP Survey Module" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher syia-ai · publishing for 526 daysInstalls 65Last detonated 19 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 48 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
LLAMA_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYPERPLEXITY_API_KEYTYPESENSE_API_KEY or --llama-api-key / --typesense-api-key / --openai-api-key / --perplexity-api-keyConfiguration, not credentials: MONGODB_DB_NAME, MONGODB_URI, TYPESENSE_HOST, TYPESENSE_PORT, TYPESENSE_PROTOCOL, VENDOR_MODEL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso syia.ai, siya.com, llamaindex.ai, google.com, qtweb.net, bing.com, amazonaws.com, perplexity.ai, ccs-service.net, or.jp, krs.co.kr, veracity.com, dnv.com, lr.org, bureauveritas.com, eagle.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names syia.ai, siya.com, llamaindex.ai, google.com, qtweb.net, bing.com, amazonaws.com, perplexity.ai, ccs-service.net, or.jp, krs.co.kr, veracity.com, dnv.com, lr.org, bureauveritas.com, eagle.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects LLAMA_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, PERPLEXITY_API_KEY, TYPESENSE_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx syia-mcp-survey-2025-x7k9

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'dotenv'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'typesense'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: SyntaxError: f-string: unmatched '('
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.3sprocess8 of 48 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsmcp_survey/tools.py:2827 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringawait page1.get_by_role('textbox', name='Enter your password').fill(uid_password)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocument_parse/llamaparse.py:469 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Set it in your environment, in a .env file, or provide it with --llama-api-key.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsmcp_survey/tools.py:2826 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringawait page1.get_by_role('textbox', name='Enter your password').click()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codemcp_survey/scheduler/schedule.py:105 · Python exec or eval of computed codecron = eval(job["cron"]) if isinstance(job["cron"], str) else job["cron"]Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_survey/tools.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import ABS_CREDENTIALS, BV_CREDENTIALS, LR_CREDENTIALS, DNV_CREDENTIALS, KR_CREDENTIALS, NK_CREDENTIALS, CCS_CREDENTIALSFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedmcp_survey/Agent/app/sandbox/core/terminal.py:234 · Destructive file system command detected"rm -rf /*",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedmcp_survey/Agent/app/sandbox/core/terminal.py:233 · Destructive file system command detected"rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicemcp_survey/Agent/app/sandbox/core/terminal.py:234 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"rm -rf /*",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicemcp_survey/Agent/app/sandbox/core/terminal.py:233 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocument_parse/llamaparse.py:509 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Set it in your environment, in a .env file, or provide it with --llama-api-key.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandmcp_survey/Agent/app/sandbox/core/terminal.py:238 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"chmod -R 777 /",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)mcp_survey/Agent/config/config.toml:26 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network[mcp_server.vessel_search]Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandmcp_survey/Agent/app/sandbox/core/terminal.py:239 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"chown -R",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 68 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for syia-mcp-survey-2025-x7k9@0.1.17 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim syia-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim syia-aiPropose a patch to the maintainer