swiss-transport-mcp@0.5.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for Swiss public transport – OJP journey planner, real-time departures, disruptions, occupancy, ticket prices, train formations and open data from opentransportdata.swiss" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
FORMATION_API_KEYOCCUPANCY_API_KEYOJP_FARE_API_KEYSIRI_SX_API_KEYTRANSPORT_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: GITHUB_OUTPUT, TRANSPORT_CKAN_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso opentransportdata.swiss, siri.org.uk, vdv.de, shields.io, githubusercontent.com, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names opentransportdata.swiss, siri.org.uk, vdv.de, shields.io, githubusercontent.com, claude.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FORMATION_API_KEY, OCCUPANCY_API_KEY, OJP_FARE_API_KEY, SIRI_SX_API_KEY, TRANSPORT_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"FZ": "👨👩👧 Familienzone",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."FA": "👨👩👧 Familienwagen",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.done = subprocess.run(call, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# API keys – supply via your shell / .env (never commit them).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.while kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.spec.loader.exec_module(modul)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."https://10.0.0.5/internal", # private rangeFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", # cloud metadataFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.pytest tests/ -m live -v --junitxml=live-report.xml 2>&1 | tee live-output.txtFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.modul = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""`MCPServer` lehnt einen unbekannten Schluessel schon im Konstruktor ab;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.validate_egress_url("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sdk_present = importlib.util.find_spec("opentelemetry.sdk") is not NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for swiss-transport-mcp@0.5.0 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.