Skills/PyPI/swiss-road-mobility-mcp

swiss-road-mobility-mcp@0.6.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for Swiss road mobility — shared vehicles, EV charging, traffic alerts, Park & Rail, multimodal trip planning" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher malkreide · publishing for 242 daysInstalls 165Last detonated 18 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTH_TOKENOPENTRANSPORTDATA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOWED_ORIGINS, GITHUB_OUTPUT, KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST, MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST_DISABLED, MCP_EGRESS_DNS_GUARD_DISABLED, MCP_EGRESS_EXTRA_HOSTS, MCP_HOST, MCP_LOG_FORMAT, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_PORT, MCP_RATE_LIMIT, MCP_RATE_WINDOW, MCP_TRACING_ENABLED, MCP_TRANSPORT, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, RAILWAY_PROJECT_ID, RENDER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso opentransportdata.swiss, admin.ch, sharedmobility.ch, datex2.eu, xmlsoap.org, shields.io, opendata.ch — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names opentransportdata.swiss, admin.ch, sharedmobility.ch, datex2.eu, xmlsoap.org, shields.io, opendata.ch as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, OPENTRANSPORTDATA_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx swiss-road-mobility-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL to the cloud instance metadata address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/fixture_data.py:46 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(modul)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddocker-compose.yml:28 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesmem_limit: 256m # memory cap (OOM-kill above this)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_egress.py:19 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsMETADATA = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
CRITICAL
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresssrc/swiss_road_mobility_mcp/egress.py:8 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsor compromised upstream that answers ``302 -> http://169.254.169.254/`` (aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/swiss_road_mobility_mcp/server.py:1814 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkto the plain MCPServer SSE runner if the app/middleware wiring is unavailableFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddocker-compose.yml:12 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesrestart: unless-stopped # SCALE-006: auto-recover from crash / OOM-killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_session_start_hook.sh:296 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$MUT"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/swiss_road_mobility_mcp/server.py:1800 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkOn top of MCPServer's own SSE Starlette app we layer three pure-ASGIFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/live-tests.yml:52 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespytest -m "live" --junitxml=live-report.xml 2>&1 | tee live-output.txtFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_spec_2026_07_28.py:249 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkDer SDK-Default fuer `MCPServer(version=...)` ist der leere String. GemessenFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/fixture_data.py:41 · Dynamic module loadingmodul = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_cache_hints.py:85 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"""`MCPServer` lehnt einen unbekannten Schluessel schon im Konstruktor ab;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_ruff_pin.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(call, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,211 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for swiss-road-mobility-mcp@0.6.1 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim malkreide: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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