swiss-food-safety-mcp@1.2.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP Server for Swiss Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office (BLV) open data — no auth required" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso admin.ch, cube.link, shields.io, opendata.swiss, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir /wheels/*.whl && rm -rf /wheelsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.spec.loader.exec_module(modul)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."No .gitignore in the repo (only .dockerignore is tracked) — no .env/.env.* ignore rules",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.inhalt = "ID;DE;EN\ncp1;Kontaminanten;Contaminants\n".encode()Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.done = subprocess.run(call, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."No .env.example and no CI secret-scanning workflow (gitleaks/trufflehog). Residual risk is low because the server uses zero secrets, but the ARCH-005 hygiene controls are absent"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ergebnis = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert not a["kopfzeile"].startswith(""), nameFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.inhalt = "Year,Canton,Count\n2024,ZH,7\n".encode()Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.pytest tests/ -m live -v --junitxml=live-report.xml 2>&1 | tee live-output.txtFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.echtes_git = subprocess.run(["which", "git"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.modul = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if a["kopfzeile"].startswith(""):Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for swiss-food-safety-mcp@1.2.0 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim malkreide: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +2 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.