Skills/PyPI/swiss-energy-mcp

swiss-energy-mcp@0.5.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server für Schweizer Energiedaten – BFE Elektrizitätsproduktionsanlagen, Windkraft, Wasserkraft, Photovoltaik, Solareignung, Energiestädte via GeoAdmin REST API und opendata.swiss" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher hayal-oezkan-hayal.oezkan · publishing for 242 daysInstalls 434Last detonated 19 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso admin.ch, opendata.swiss, shields.io, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx swiss-energy-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_unit.py:140 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsassert_url_allowed("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill command.claude/hooks/session-start.sh:54 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.claude/hooks/session-start.sh:50 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswhile kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_session_start_hook.py:516 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_unit.py:247 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvorlage = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / ".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_unit.py:217 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Genau der Wert, den README und .env.example nennen.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_ruff_pin_doku.py:56 · Dynamic module loadingmodul = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/swiss_energy_mcp/server.py:45 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"""Build a MCPServer lifespan that owns the shared HTTP client."""Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_session_start_hook.py:89 · Python subprocess execution detectedfertig = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/fixture_data.py:40 · Dynamic module loadingmodul = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_cache_hints.py:86 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"""`MCPServer` lehnt einen unbekannten Schluessel schon im Konstruktor ab;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/swiss_energy_mcp/settings.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``.env.example`` document — died there as a ``SettingsError``. TheFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_ruff_pin_doku.py:57 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(modul)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/swiss_energy_mcp/settings.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``SWISS_ENERGY_``) or an optional ``.env`` file. This keeps configuration outFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_unit.py:249 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesziel = tmp_path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_session_start_hook.py:313 · Python subprocess execution detectedfertig = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/fixture_data.py:45 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(modul)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_ruff_pin.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(call, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/swiss_energy_mcp/settings.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_session_start_hook.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedergebnis = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.claude/hooks/session-start.sh:52 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/live-tests.yml:52 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespytest tests/ -m live -v --tb=short --junitxml=live-report.xml 2>&1 | tee live-output.txtFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_unit.py:243 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""`.env.example` woertlich als `.env` — die Datei sagt selbst, manFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,321 tok
2 files · 75 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for swiss-energy-mcp@0.5.2 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hayal-oezkan-hayal.oezkan: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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