Skills/PyPI/swiss-academic-libraries-mcp

swiss-academic-libraries-mcp@1.3.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server für Schweizer Wissenschaftsbibliotheken: swisscovery (SRU), e-rara/e-periodica/e-manuscripta (OAI-PMH) und Open-Access-Rechtsliteratur (sui generis, ex/ante, Repositorium.ch). Kein API-Key erforderlich." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher malkreide · publishing for 242 daysInstalls 149Last detonated 39 min ago
$claude mcp add swiss-academic-libraries-mcp -- uvx swiss-academic-libraries-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso crossref.org, arxiv.org, doi.org, e-rara.ch, openarchives.org, loc.gov, slsp.ch, shields.io, e-periodica.ch, e-manuscripta.ch, purl.org, a9.com, sui-generis.ch, ex-ante.ch, repositorium.ch — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx swiss-academic-libraries-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_ruff_pin.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(call, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.claude/hooks/README.md:170 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /tmp/gp-clone /tmp/gp-unborn /tmp/gp-hang /tmp/gp-master /tmp/gp-master-src /tmp/gp-ssh.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_oa_legal.py:446 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsoa_legal._assert_host_allowed("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/live-tests.yml:83 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespytest -m live -v --junitxml=live-report.xml 2>&1 | tee live-output.txtFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.claude/hooks/README.md:106 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsprintf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nsleep 120\n' > /tmp/gp-ssh.sh && chmod +x /tmp/gp-ssh.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Excessive HTML entities detectedtests/test_server.py:341 · Excessive HTML entities detected — may be obfuscating content<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Excessive HTML entities detectedtests/test_server.py:342 · Excessive HTML entities detected — may be obfuscating content<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP address.claude/hooks/README.md:86 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringgit -C /tmp/gp-clone remote add origin https://192.0.2.1/x.gitFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_cache_hints.py:86 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"""`MCPServer` lehnt einen unbekannten Schluessel schon im Konstruktor ab;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP address.claude/hooks/README.md:86 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot namegit -C /tmp/gp-clone remote add origin https://192.0.2.1/x.gitFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Excessive HTML entities detectedtests/test_server.py:343 · Excessive HTML entities detected — may be obfuscating content<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈12,728 tok
2 files · 73 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.