sw-mcp@0.2.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server that drives a local SolidWorks instance over COM for parametric part modelling." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoft.com, solidworks.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.1.0
vet-skills diff sw-mcp 0.1.0 0.2.0This version reaches for something 0.1.0 did not: 2 new hosts (microsoft.com, solidworks.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- microsoft.com, solidworks.com
0.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", _PROBE], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.with tests/fixtures/bracket.model.json. When read_model's output changes onFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.run = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", probe], stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.bracket = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.exec(compiled, namespace) # noqa: S102 - the point of the tool; off unless allowedFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.spec.loader.exec_module(bracket)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.