Skills/PyPI/superproductivity-mcp

superproductivity-mcp@2.2.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Superproductivity MCP server for Claude Desktop integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ben-elliot-nice · publishing for 203 daysInstalls 257Last detonated 56 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx superproductivity-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmise.toml:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_.file = ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mcp-proxy.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesModes (detected from .env on every spawn):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mcp-proxy.py:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCredential loading is anchored to Path.cwd()/.env — never __file__.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mcp-proxy.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdegraded No .env found → returns setup guidance from all toolsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesAdd to `.env`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmise trust # required once per clone — allows mise to auto-source .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mcp-proxy.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesto prod when .env appears (two-pass transition).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationCLAUDE.md:18 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeThen use the `reload_mcp` tool in Claude Code to hot-reload after source changes — no session restart needed.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mcp-proxy.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprod .env present → uvx superproductivity-mcpFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationscripts/mcp-proxy.py:32 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime"description": "Hot-reload the MCP server from local source without disconnecting Claude Code.",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-22-v2.2.0-bridge-hardening.md:1300 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filegit add scripts/mcp-proxy.py .mcp.json mise.toml .env.example CLAUDE.md .gitignoreFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mcp-proxy.py:80 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detected.github/workflows/version-gate.yml:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/superproductivity_mcp/bridge.py:78 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionplugin/plugin.js:395 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesawait this.log(`Event send failed: ${e.message}`, 'warn');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈164 tok
2 files · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for superproductivity-mcp@2.2.1 as of 10 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ben-elliot-nice: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ben-elliot-nicePropose a patch to the maintainer