supermcp@0.10.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Reddit, Twitter, LinkedIn, BlackHatWorld, Dev.to, Medium & Google Trends/News MCP server for AI tools. Markdown output, reads your Chrome login session." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso webmatrices.com, x.com, reddit.com, medium.com, linkedin.com, pinterest.com, purl.org, dev.to, algolianet.com, blackhatworld.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
key = input(" Paste your API key: ").strip()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.key = input(" Paste your API key: ").strip()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["playwright", "install", "chromium"], timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["playwright", "install", "chromium"], timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["playwright", "install", "chromium"], timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.key = input(" Paste your API key: ").strip()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."url": "/rozovayamechta1/%D1%83%D1%8E%D1%82-%D0%B2-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B5/",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.subprocess.run(["playwright", "install", "chromium"], timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["playwright", "install", "chromium"], timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["playwright", "install", "chromium"], timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.