Skills/PyPI/sumologic-mcp-python

sumologic-mcp-python@0.1.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Sumo Logic API integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sumologic · publishing for 405 daysInstalls 59Last detonated 44 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SUMOLOGIC_ACCESS_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso sumologic.com, slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names sumologic.com, slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SUMOLOGIC_ACCESS_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sumologic-mcp-python

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Slack webhook URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@if [ ! -f .env ]; then \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:47 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Creating .env from .env.dev template..."; \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:10 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:39 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R sumologic:sumologic /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssumologic_mcp/config.py:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.dev .env; \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssumologic_mcp/config.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env file if it existsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Slack webhook URLsumologic_mcp/tools/monitor_tools.py:3577 · Slack webhook URL — data will be sent to Slackelif not webhook_url.strip().startswith('https://hooks.slack.com/'):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/systemd/install.sh:84 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R "$SERVICE_USER:$SERVICE_GROUP" "$INSTALL_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/systemd/install.sh:62 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R "$SERVICE_USER:$SERVICE_GROUP" "$LOG_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/systemd/install.sh:64 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 755 "$CONFIG_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/systemd/install.sh:61 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R "$SERVICE_USER:$SERVICE_GROUP" "$INSTALL_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/systemd/install.sh:63 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R root:root "$CONFIG_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 66 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sumologic: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Slack webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sumologicPropose a patch to the maintainer