Skills/PyPI/structx-mcp

structx-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for struct-x — install in Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, or any MCP-compatible client to give your agent structured-extraction superpowers." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher struct-x-ai · publishing for 177 daysInstalls 44Last detonated 3 h ago
$claude mcp add structx-mcp -- uvx structx-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
STRUCTX_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: STRUCTX_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
structx.ai (its own)Also public-relay.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names public-relay.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects STRUCTX_API_KEY only into requests to structx.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets STRUCTX_API_KEY=structx.ai -- uvx structx-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.4sprocess5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresssrc/structx_mcp/_url_safety.py:4 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsinjection — "please summarize http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

No other findings across 1,015 lines in 12 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈79 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for structx-mcp@0.1.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.