streamlit-mcp@0.14.4
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Serve an existing Streamlit app as an MCP server — agents drive it natively, no browser." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OPENROUTER_API_KEYor--bearer-token- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.8.0
vet-skills diff streamlit-mcp 0.8.0 0.14.4This version reaches for something 0.8.0 did not: 1 new host (openrouter.ai) · 1 new credential variable (OPENROUTER_API_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- openrouter.ai
- New credential variables
- OPENROUTER_API_KEY
0.8.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
from .env import ArenaEnvFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from .env import ArenaEnv, StepBudgetExceededFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from .env import Step, StepBudgetExceededFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""st.json serializes a whole structure, so one output could otherwise crowd out the rest ofFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Included verbatim from the repo root so the docs never drift from the canonical changelog.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.assert json.loads(out)["mcpServers"]["streamlit-mcp"]["url"] == "http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.from .env import ArenaEnv, StepBudgetExceededFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from .env import ArenaEnv, StepBudgetExceededFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.spec.loader.exec_module(module) # type: ignore[union-attr]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert json.loads(out)["mcpServers"]["streamlit-mcp"]["url"] == "http://[::1]:8000/sse"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for streamlit-mcp@0.14.4 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dkedar7: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.