Skills/PyPI/stock-mcp

stock-mcp@1.0.10

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "股票数据 MCP 服务" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fengwei168 · publishing for 285 daysInstalls 83Last detonated 5 h ago
$claude mcp add stock-mcp -- uvx stock-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
QUANT_DB_PASSWORDQUANT_SECRET_KEYQUANT_TOKEN_EXPIRE or --generate-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: QUANT_DB_HOST, QUANT_DB_NAME, QUANT_DB_PORT, QUANT_DB_USER, QUANT_SERVER_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso sina.com.cn — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names sina.com.cn as well as its own vendor. The guard injects QUANT_DB_PASSWORD, QUANT_SECRET_KEY, QUANT_TOKEN_EXPIRE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx stock-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pymysql'
0.2sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

No findings across 1,411 lines in 16 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for stock-mcp@1.0.10 as of 5 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.