Skills/PyPI/statuspro-mcp-server

statuspro-mcp-server@1.0.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the StatusPro API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher dougborg · publishing for 387 daysInstalls 59Last detonated 7 h ago
$claude mcp add statuspro-mcp-server -- uvx statuspro-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTH_TOKENMCP_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRETSTATUSPRO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, STATUSPRO_BASE_URL, STATUSPRO_MCP_LOG_FORMAT, STATUSPRO_MCP_LOG_LEVEL
Where it talks to
orderstatuspro.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, MCP_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET, STATUSPRO_API_KEY and talks to orderstatuspro.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MCP_AUTH_TOKEN=orderstatuspro.com,MCP_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET=orderstatuspro.com,STATUSPRO_API_KEY=orderstatuspro.com -- uvx statuspro-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# cp .env.example .env # add your STATUSPRO_API_KEYFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- STATUSPRO_API_KEY=${STATUSPRO_API_KEY:?Set STATUSPRO_API_KEY in .env or environment}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The .env file is loaded automatically from the project root.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/statuspro_mcp/server.py:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmessage="Please set it in your .env file or environment.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Or from this directory: docker compose --env-file ../.env upFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/statuspro_mcp/server.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files1. Loads environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:36 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R mcp:mcp /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/statuspro_mcp/tools/orders.py:512 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# failures (rate limit, transport error, auth) don't kill the wholeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 57 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for statuspro-mcp-server@1.0.0 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.