Skills/PyPI/stackchan-mcp

stackchan-mcp@0.20.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Two-faced MCP gateway for StackChan (xiaozhi-esp32): bridges stdio MCP clients to the ESP32 over WebSocket + HTTP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher kisaragi-mochi · publishing for 196 daysInstalls 841Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
BEARER_TOKENELEVENLABS_API_KEYSTACKCHAN_AUDIO_HOOK_TOKENSTACKCHAN_PCM_TOKENSTACKCHAN_TOKENVISION_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CAPTURE_PORT, DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_PORT, STACKCHAN_AUDIO_HOOK_URL, STACKCHAN_EDGE_TTS_DEFAULT_VOICE, STACKCHAN_ELEVEN_DEFAULT_SPEAKER, STACKCHAN_ELEVEN_MODEL, STACKCHAN_ELEVENLABS_KEY, STACKCHAN_FISH_AUDIO_BACKEND, STACKCHAN_FISH_AUDIO_KEY, STACKCHAN_FISH_AUDIO_MODEL, STACKCHAN_FISH_AUDIO_URL, STACKCHAN_IRODORI_KEY, STACKCHAN_IRODORI_SPEAKER, STACKCHAN_IRODORI_STEPS, STACKCHAN_IRODORI_URL, STACKCHAN_OWNER_ID, STACKCHAN_VOICEVOX_DEFAULT_SPEAKER, STACKCHAN_VOICEVOX_URL, VISION_HOST, VISION_URL, WS_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso elevenlabs.io, fish.audio — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names elevenlabs.io, fish.audio as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BEARER_TOKEN, ELEVENLABS_API_KEY, STACKCHAN_AUDIO_HOOK_TOKEN, STACKCHAN_PCM_TOKEN, STACKCHAN_TOKEN, VISION_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx stackchan-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_cli.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``python-dotenv`` resolves ``.env`` via ``find_dotenv()``, whichFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_gateway.py:104 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert gw.vision_url == "http://192.0.2.10:8766/capture"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:70 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesgrep "^STACKCHAN_TOKEN=" gateway/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_fish_audio.py:122 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Env vars are read lazily so values from a late-loaded .env still apply."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/tts/irodori.py:146 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# constructed at import time, before ``.env`` is loaded, soFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_gateway.py:104 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert gw.vision_url == "http://192.0.2.10:8766/capture"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/cli.py:433 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``gateway/.env`` and contaminating environment-isolation tests.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedstackchan_mcp/cli.py:239 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesgrep "^STACKCHAN_TOKEN=" gateway/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/cli.py:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The preflight is intentionally side-effect-free: it loads ``.env``, readsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/tts/edge_tts.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesaccess (not cached at import/construction time) so a .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files## 7. `.env` edit checklistFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsstackchan_mcp/cli.py:380 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking- ``https://user:pass@host/path`` → ``https://***:***@host/path``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/cli.py:424 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Lazy ``.env`` loader exposed as a single attachable seam.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/tts/irodori.py:162 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files:data:`DEFAULT_IRODORI_SPEAKER` — so values loaded from ``.env``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/tts/edge_tts.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileschain resolves before _configure_gateway_startup() loads .env —Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/tts/elevenlabs.py:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# loaded from .env after import still take effect (same rationaleFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Editing `.env` does NOT reload the running process. **MCP process restart is required** (restart the host application or reconnect).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/cli.py:444 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load ``.env`` first so that a WS_PORT / PORT defined only there resolvesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstackchan_mcp/ownership.py:58 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill the target process; use a non-destructive Win32 API check instead.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_emoji_expression.py:44 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentassert strip_emoji_for_plain_tts("work 🧑‍💻 done") == "work done"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_cli.py:618 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingout = _redact_url_secrets("https://user:[email protected]:8443/capture")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesgrep "^BEARER_TOKEN=" gateway/.env # legacy aliasFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_cli.py:329 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Without stubbing it, the developer's real ``gateway/.env`` is loaded intoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedstackchan_mcp/ownership.py:128 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_cli.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreal ``gateway/.env``. We instead replace ``cli._load_dotenv`` withFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_cli.py:780 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``owner-<port>.lock``. ``_run_ownership_check`` loads ``.env`` beforeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_cli.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Make preflight tests independent of any host ``.env`` / inherited env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_cli.py:693 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://signer:[email protected]/capture?token=tk_abc123",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/cli.py:445 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# the same per-port lock the running gateway claims. Startup loads ``.env``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/tts/fish_audio.py:174 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesengine is constructed at import time, before ``.env`` is loaded,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstackchan_mcp/tts/irodori.py:175 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files:data:`DEFAULT_IRODORI_STEPS` — so values loaded from ``.env``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_irodori.py:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesimported (and the engine registered) before ``.env`` is loaded, soFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_cli.py:596 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert "(derived) http://192.168.1.42:8766/capture" in outFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_notify_config.py:214 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesthe original template string so a single bad user template cannot killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈746 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for stackchan-mcp@0.20.0 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kisaragi-mochi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim kisaragi-mochiPropose a patch to the maintainer