Skills/PyPI/stackapps-suite-mcp

stackapps-suite-mcp@0.1.7

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP gateway for the StackApps tool suite — pay per call in USDC via x402, no account required" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher explorer-64 · publishing for 136 daysInstalls 59Last detonated 7 h ago
$claude mcp add stackapps-suite-mcp -- uvx stackapps-suite-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
IMAGCON_PROFILE_TOKENSTACKBILL_PROFILE_TOKENWALLET_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: STACKAPPS_MAX_USD_PER_CALL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso imagcon.app, stackbill.app — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names imagcon.app, stackbill.app as well as its own vendor. The guard injects IMAGCON_PROFILE_TOKEN, STACKBILL_PROFILE_TOKEN, WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx stackapps-suite-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionstackapps_mcp/server.py:83 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"""Generate a full PWA icon set (all sizes, manifest.json) from a local PNG/JPEG/WebP image via the Imagcon x402 anonymous endpoint. Costs $0.10 USDC. output_dir should be an absolute path."""Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

No other findings across 1,634 lines in 17 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈63 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for stackapps-suite-mcp@0.1.7 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.