Skills/PyPI/ssh-mcp-bridge

ssh-mcp-bridge@2.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "FastMCP-based SSH Bridge for Model Context Protocol" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ssh-mcp-bridge-team · publishing for 78 daysInstalls 79Last detonated 7 h ago
$claude mcp add ssh-mcp-bridge -- uvx ssh-mcp-bridge
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEYAUTH_MODEAUTH0_CLIENT_IDAUTH0_CLIENT_SECRETJWT_SIGNING_KEYSSH_MCP_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BASE_URL, IDP_AUDIENCE, IDP_ISSUER, IDP_JWKS_URI
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso auth0.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names auth0.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, AUTH_MODE, AUTH0_CLIENT_ID, AUTH0_CLIENT_SECRET, JWT_SIGNING_KEY, SSH_MCP_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ssh-mcp-bridge

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/ssh_mcp_bridge/api/http_server.py:243 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_http_app = mcp_server.http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/ssh_mcp_bridge/api/__init__.py:6 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network__all__ = ["create_mcp_server", "create_http_server"]Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprivate_key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_config.py:25 · References a credential file in the home directoryprivate_key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprivate_key_path: "~/.ssh/id_rsa"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_file_transfer_policy.py:175 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert sftp.files["/uploads/upload.txt"] == b"uploaded"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_config.py:48 · References a credential file in the home directoryprivate_key_path: "~/.ssh/id_rsa"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ssh-mcp-bridge@2.2.0 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

ssh-mcp-bridge@2.2.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills