Skills/PyPI/ssh-agent-mcp

ssh-agent-mcp@0.3.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "SSH Agent MCP服务 - 支持SSH连接管理、命令执行和SFTP文件传输的完整MCP服务器" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher zhijun · publishing for 391 daysInstalls 132Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SSH_PASSWORDSSH_PRIVATE_KEYSSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD or --key-password / --private-key-passwordConfiguration, not credentials: SSH_HOST, SSH_MAX_CHARS, SSH_PORT, SSH_TIMEOUT, SSH_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SSH_PASSWORD, SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, SSH_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ssh_agent_mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Reads credential paths from the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsssh_manager.py:432 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig_path = os.path.expanduser('~/.ssh/config')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directoryssh_manager.py:174 · Reads credential paths from the home directorywith open(os.path.expanduser('~/.ssh/config'), 'r') as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsssh_manager.py:451 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.warning("~/.ssh/config 文件不存在,使用主机名作为直接连接")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsssh_manager.py:177 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.warning("~/.ssh/config 文件不存在")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsssh_manager.py:174 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswith open(os.path.expanduser('~/.ssh/config'), 'r') as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ssh_agent_mcp@0.3.3 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zhijun: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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