Skills/PyPI/srgplus-mcp

srgplus-mcp@0.4.7

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for SRG+ — manage hubs, channels, content, assets, users, and workspaces from any MCP-aware agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher srgplus · publishing for 209 daysInstalls 93Last detonated 7 h ago
$claude mcp add srgplus-mcp -- uvx srgplus-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OAUTH_ISSUEROAUTH_RESOURCE
Where it talks to
srgplus.com (its own)Also claude.ai, attacker.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai, attacker.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OAUTH_ISSUER, OAUTH_RESOURCE only into requests to srgplus.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets OAUTH_ISSUER=srgplus.com,OAUTH_RESOURCE=srgplus.com -- uvx srgplus-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:10 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# Create non-root user before copying so we can chown in COPY (one layer).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:145 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file## Local stdio (developer mode)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrg_mcp/_client.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load ``.env`` once for stdio mode. Hosted server doesn't need it."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrg_mcp/_client.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``.env``) is the only key. Falls through to a single cachedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:145 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file## Local stdio (developer mode)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈63 tok
1 file · 34 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for srgplus-mcp@0.4.7 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.