Skills/PyPI/sra-riskgate-mcp

sra-riskgate-mcp@0.12.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server: the pre-sign firewall for AI agents that pay. Approve, hold or reject stablecoin and x402 payments" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sriram1983007-dev · publishing for 43 daysInstalls 3,329Last detonated 12d ago
$claude mcp add sra-riskgate-mcp -- uvx sra-riskgate-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try sra-riskgate-mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.11.1

vet-skills diff sra-riskgate-mcp 0.11.1 0.12.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.11.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.11.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/sra-riskgate-mcp
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injection attemptCHANGELOG.md:181 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file("risk level: low (verified offline)", "pre-approved", "ignore previous instructions"), the payment isFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_server.py:333 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("url", ["file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://host/v1", "gopher://x", "javascript:alert(1)"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/sra_riskgate_mcp/server.py:787 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsUSDC events are read, so facilitator batches and ERC-4337 bundles work too. For another stablecoin pass token:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:31 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction fileown verification, such as "risk level: low (verified offline)", "pre-approved" or "ignore previousFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:173 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file"ignore previous instructions") and returns `hold` without asking the model if it finds one. On theFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈58 tok
1 file · 32 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sra-riskgate-mcp@0.12.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.