sprocket-systems.coda.sdk-mcp@1.2.3
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for Coda SDK documentation, validation, and live data" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 25 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CODA_API_TOKENCODA_SDK_MCP_CODA_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CODA_API_GROUP_ID, CODA_API_URL, CODA_SDK_MCP_CODA_BASE_URL, CODA_SDK_MCP_HOST, CODA_SDK_MCP_LOG_FILE, CODA_SDK_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, CODA_SDK_MCP_PORT, CODA_SDK_MCP_TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso sprocket.systems — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names sprocket.systems as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CODA_API_TOKEN, CODA_SDK_MCP_CODA_API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
ret = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.| `DANISH` | `"DAN"` |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.exec(_code)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.return ret.json()["parsed_input_profile"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.ret = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sprocket-systems.coda.sdk-mcp@1.2.3 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.