Skills/PyPI/spotify-mcp-jamiew

spotify-mcp-jamiew@0.9.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server connecting LLMs to Spotify, with smart-batching and large-playlist tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jamiew · publishing for 262 daysInstalls 1,062Last detonated 9 h ago
$claude mcp add spotify-mcp-jamiew -- uvx spotify-mcp-jamiew
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID, SPOTIFY_REDIRECT_URI
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso spotify.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names spotify.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx spotify-mcp-jamiew

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.8.1

vet-skills diff spotify-mcp-jamiew 0.8.1 0.9.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.8.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.8.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_integration.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env, so turn it off. A temp HOME keeps the user's config out too;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Collects environment variables by secret-like namestests/test_integration.py:36 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesenv = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k.startswith("UV_")}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files.claude/skills/spotify-api-watch/SKILL.md:67 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesUpdate the tracking section in `README.md` and `CLAUDE.md` if a change alters what thisFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/spotify_mcp/spotify_api.py:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load configuration from environment variables, then a .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesConfiguration comes from environment variables first, then a `.env` file for localFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,757 tok
2 files · 34 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for spotify-mcp-jamiew@0.9.2 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.