spotify-mcp-jamiew@0.9.2
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server connecting LLMs to Spotify, with smart-batching and large-playlist tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID, SPOTIFY_REDIRECT_URI- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso spotify.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names spotify.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.8.1
vet-skills diff spotify-mcp-jamiew 0.8.1 0.9.2In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.8.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
0.8.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# .env, so turn it off. A temp HOME keeps the user's config out too;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k.startswith("UV_")}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.Update the tracking section in `README.md` and `CLAUDE.md` if a change alters what thisFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."""Load configuration from environment variables, then a .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Configuration comes from environment variables first, then a `.env` file for localFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for spotify-mcp-jamiew@0.9.2 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.