sparkplug-b-mcp-server@0.1.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for Sparkplug B (MQTT + protobuf convention for industrial/SCADA data): node/device discovery, metrics, commands, host state" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SPARKPLUG_MQTT_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: HOST_PORT, SPARKPLUG_GROUP_ID, SPARKPLUG_HOST_ID, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_CLIENT_ID, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_HOST, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_KEEPALIVE, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_PORT, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_TLS_CA_CERTS, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_TLS_CLIENT_CERT, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_TLS_CLIENT_KEY, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_USE_TLS, SPARKPLUG_MQTT_USERNAME, TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SPARKPLUG_MQTT_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run(["docker", "compose", "up", "-d"], cwd=SERVER_DIR, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["docker", "compose", "down"], cwd=SERVER_DIR, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.&& chown -R mcpuser:mcpuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sparkplug-b-mcp-server@0.1.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.