Skills/PyPI/sovereign-mcp-audit

sovereign-mcp-audit@1.0.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Probe an MCP server for input it should refuse. Connects as a client, inventories the tools, and reports what was accepted." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mattijsmoens · publishing for 243 daysInstalls 45Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sovereign-mcp-audit

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration; URL to the cloud instance metadata address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssovereign_mcp_audit/audit.py:140 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("file_scheme", "file:///etc/passwd", "HIGH",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsovereign_mcp_audit/audit.py:97 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsvariables, so pass secrets explicitly with --env KEY=VALUE. Check that it runsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesovereign_mcp_audit/audit.py:939 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codesovereign-mcp-audit --include-writes --json report.json -- npx -y @you/serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresssovereign_mcp_audit/audit.py:131 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials("cloud_metadata", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "HIGH",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssovereign_mcp_audit/audit.py:285 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesProbe("path_traversal", "../../../../etc/passwd", "HIGH",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresssovereign_mcp_audit/audit.py:137 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target("private_range", "http://10.0.0.1/", "HIGH",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_positive_control.py:58 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesovereign_mcp_audit/audit.py:940 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codesovereign-mcp-audit --env API_TOKEN=abc123 -- npx -y @vendor/their-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_audit_positive_control.py:143 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsfetches http://169.254.169.254/ on a caller's behalf hands over cloudFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sovereign-mcp-audit@1.0.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mattijsmoens: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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