Skills/PyPI/sonilo-mcp

sonilo-mcp@0.28.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Sonilo AI music generation API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sonilo-ai · publishing for 156 daysInstalls 897Last detonated 28 min ago
$claude mcp add sonilo-mcp -- uvx sonilo-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SONILO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SONILO_API_URL, SONILO_MCP_ALLOW_ANY_PATH, SONILO_MCP_BASE_PATH, TIME_OUT_SECONDS
Where it talks to
sonilo.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SONILO_API_KEY and talks to sonilo.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets SONILO_API_KEY=sonilo.com -- uvx sonilo-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_api.py:4255 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_url", ["file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://x/y.mp4"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sonilo_mcp/api.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import read_api_keyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_api.py:1232 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sonilo_mcp/api.py:4280 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(player_cmd, check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_api.py:1235 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/sonilo_mcp/api.py:1161 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesA hard process kill (SIGKILL/OOM/host crash) mid-write can leave aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_api.py:4797 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# A hard process kill mid-write can leave a non-empty, TRUNCATED file atFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sonilo_mcp/api.py:3209 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileshere: the suffix (a `.txt` script is a guaranteed 422 after an upload)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_api.py:6264 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"""A .txt script is a guaranteed 422 after a full video upload, so it isFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_api.py:5093 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvoice_url="file:///etc/passwd", music_url="https://cdn.test/m.mp3"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_api.py:4478 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_url", ["file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://x/y.mp4"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 19 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sonilo-mcp@0.28.1 as of 3 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.