Skills/PyPI/solucortex-mcp

solucortex-mcp@1.1.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Official MCP server for SoluCortex — living technical memory for AI agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher soluai-spa · publishing for 72 daysInstalls 111Last detonated 14 min ago
$claude mcp add solucortex-mcp -- uvx solucortex-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SOLUCORTEX_API_KEY or --allow-unauthenticatedConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_TRANSPORT, SOLUCORTEX_PROJECT_ID, SOLUCORTEX_URL
Where it talks to
solucortex.ai (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SOLUCORTEX_API_KEY and talks to solucortex.ai. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets SOLUCORTEX_API_KEY=solucortex.ai -- uvx solucortex-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/solucortex_mcp/server.py:297 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"it prevents. NEVER include real secrets (tokens, passwords, .env, credentials)."),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/solucortex_mcp/server.py:71 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRules: never store secrets (tokens, passwords, .env values) in a memory — recordFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 3. $PWD/ai/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"$PWD/ai/.env.ai" \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 4. $PWD/.env.aiFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/mcp-registry.yml:24 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mv mcp-publisher /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 5. <repo>/.env (fallback default)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 2. $PWD/ai/.env.ai (SoluAI agent env — common)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 29 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.