Skills/PyPI/solace-event-portal-designer-mcp

solace-event-portal-designer-mcp@0.1.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Solace Event Portal Designer API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher solacelabs · publishing for 379 daysInstalls 70Last detonated 30 min ago
$claude mcp add solace-event-portal-designer-mcp -- uvx solace-event-portal-designer-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SOLACE_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SOLACE_API_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso solace.dev, solace.cloud — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names solace.dev, solace.cloud as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SOLACE_API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx solace-event-portal-designer-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.0sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsolace_event_portal_designer_mcp/data/ep-designer.json:1 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… },\n \"$id\": \"https://example.com/person.schema.json\"\n }\n },\n \"messages\": {\n \"RegistrationEvent_0_1_0\": {\n \"x-ep-event-id\": \"8k62hfhhaqx\",\n \"x-ep-event-version-id\": \"yn8evv7wfve\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/comp…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

No other findings across 145 lines in 4 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for solace-event-portal-designer-mcp@0.1.2 as of 5 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.