Skills/PyPI/snyk-apiweb-mcp

snyk-apiweb-mcp@1.3.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Snyk API & Web (Probely) — create targets, run scans, manage findings" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher snyk · publishing for 85 daysInstalls 182Last detonated 15 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso probely.com, probely.app — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx snyk-apiweb-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssnyk_apiweb/config.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env from project root so MCP_SAW_API_KEY persists across sessionsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_tools.py:314 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials302, {"Location": "https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:173 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Additional configuration options</summary> - **Override the base URL:** add `"MCP_SAW_BASE_URL": "https://your-instance-url"` to the `env` block. - **UFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsnyk_apiweb/config.py:148 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tools.py:188 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_assert_url_is_safe("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmonkeypatch.setenv("MCP_SAW_CONFIG_PATH", "/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_tools.py:212 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target_assert_url_is_safe("https://172.16.0.1/schema.json")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssnyk_apiweb/config.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(os.path.join(_project_root, ".env"), override=False)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_tools.py:198 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials_assert_url_is_safe("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_tools.py:208 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target_assert_url_is_safe("https://10.0.0.5/schema.json")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_tools.py:210 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target_assert_url_is_safe("https://192.168.1.10/schema.json")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim snyk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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