snowline-mcp@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Snowline MCP Server — WaveSpeed GPT Image 2 生图、本地后端 serve/build/health" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_ID, SNOWLINE_API_ORIGIN, SNOWLINE_BIND- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso snowball.design — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names snowball.design as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"install_command": "curl -fsSL https://snowline.snowball.design/cli | bash"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."hint": "检查 WAVESPEED_API_KEY 是否已在 .env 或 Cloudflare 环境变量中配置",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.curl -fsSL https://snowline.snowball.design/cli | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."install_command": "curl -fsSL https://snowline.snowball.design/cli | bash"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.execve(cmd[0], cmd, env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.curl -fsSL https://snowline.snowball.design/cli | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for snowline-mcp@0.1.0 as of 4 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim xdc2025: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.