Skills/PyPI/snowflake-readonly-mcp

snowflake-readonly-mcp@1.0.3

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "A Snowflake read-only MCP server with key-pair and browser SSO authentication" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nicholas-cejda-ncejda · publishing for 239 daysInstalls 162Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx snowflake-readonly-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · Example: export SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT="xy12345.us-east-1" export SNOWFLAKE_USERNAME="[email protected]" export SNOWFLAKE_WAREHOUSE="COMPUTE_WH"
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_checkpointing.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/tag-version.yml:141 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack .Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:74 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Manual setup & from-source install</b></summary> ### uvx (Recommended — no Node.js required) Just configure your MCP client using the examples in thFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_client_stdio.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_client_stdio.py:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("\nPlease add these to your .env file:")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/tag-version.yml:172 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y npm@${{ env.npm_cli_version }} publish --provenance --access publicFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternbin/install.js:41 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeconsole.error(' 1. uv (recommended): curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternbin/snowflake-mcp.js:63 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeconsole.error('Please install uv: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellbin/snowflake-mcp.js:63 · Remote installer piped to shellconsole.error('Please install uv: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:175 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Claude Desktop</b></summary> **One-click install:** Download the [latest `.mcpb` extension](https://github.com/ncejda-g2/snowflake_mcp_server/releasFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellbin/install.js:41 · Remote installer piped to shellconsole.error(' 1. uv (recommended): curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/install.js:78 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log('\nThen run: npx snowflake-readonly-mcp');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/tag-version.yml:171 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeecho "Publishing with npm $(npx -y npm@${{ env.npm_cli_version }} --version)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/tag-version.yml:140 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb validate manifest.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for snowflake-readonly-mcp@1.0.3 as of 58 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nicholas-cejda-ncejda: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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