Skills/PyPI/snodo-mcp

snodo-mcp@0.28.3

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Snodo MCP — MCP servers, planning, recon, and jobs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher snodo-dev · publishing for 77 daysInstalls 1,304Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add snodo-mcp -- uvx snodo-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 27 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso adaptivecards.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx snodo-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.27.0

vet-skills diff snodo-mcp 0.27.0 0.28.3

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.27.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'snodo'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'snodo'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'snodo'
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocess8 of 27 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.6sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/snodo/mcp/watch_job.py:217 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files$("logs").textContent = logs.log || "(no stdout output)";Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentguide_sources/following-a-run.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsnodo-guide topic="following-a-run" aliases="run,follow-run" summary="Follow an asynchronous job live" section="# Following a run"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentguide_sources/queues.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsnodo-guide topic="queues" summary="Validate and run queues" section="# Keep queues moving"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/snodo/jobs/__init__.py:409 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - fixed module and argv, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/snodo/jobs/runner.py:141 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - argv list (no shell) from build_command; task description/model are single argv elements, never interpretedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/snodo/jobs/notifications.py:88 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed argv, project path passed as one argumentFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/snodo/jobs/wrapper.py:124 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, check=False) # noqa: S603 - argv list (no shell); argv are single CLI elements from the job's task spec, never shell-interpretedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/snodo/mcp/watch_job.py:118 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…xtContent=s.status||"unknown";document.querySelector("#logs").textContent=d.logs.log||"(no stdout output)";const began=Number(s.started_at||s.created_at)*1000;const end=Number(s.comple…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/snodo/mcp/transport.py:366 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 — an observer must not kill its subjectFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 50 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for snodo-mcp@0.28.3 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.