sn1per-mcp@0.9.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Run scoped, authorized Sn1per pentest, recon and attack surface scans from AI agents; read findings." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- sn1persecurity.com (its own)Also app.test — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to sn1persecurity.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"Plugins run inside the Sn1per MCP Server process with the same user, the same sudo "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.A scan that runs through sudo is started by the terminal holder (D.5, L.6): thisFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# for the holder to report the pid of the sudo process it started.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# The recorded process, the sudo process the terminal holder started (it outlivesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# L.6: sudo gets a controlling terminal from the terminal holder, so aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return f"sudo chown root:root {self.realpath}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""The sudo process the terminal holder started (L.6), when its start time is knownFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.pseudo-terminal. Without a terminal sudo does not apply ``use_pty`` and relays aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.11.x scan (whose body runs in a subshell piped to ``tee``). With one, sudo runs theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.module run as ``python -m sniper_mcp.proc``, which gives sudo a controllingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Preferred sudo binary (D.5); `shutil.which("sudo")` is the fallback.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# L.6: "terminal" when pid is the terminal holder and front_pid the sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return f"sudo ln -s {cli_realpath} {paths.ENGINE_PATH_HINT_LINK}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.alive = True # the terminal holder is gone but sudo still runs the scan (L.6)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."hostRequirements": "Runs beside a local Sn1per install (CE 9.x or the 11.x engine). Scan and delete tools need root through a passwordless sudo rule for the Sn1per CLI; read tools run unprivileged.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["tool"], env=env, check=True, timeout=60, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.StalePopen([realpaths.SNIPER_SHARE_CLI, "-t", "app.example", "-m", "stealth"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."relative-entry": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.'Add a sudoers drop-in with "sudo visudo -f /etc/sudoers.d/sn1per-mcp" containing this 'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.child = subprocess.Popen(command, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, close_fds=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(["tool"], env={"PATH": "bin"}, cwd=str(c_dir),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.'Add a sudoers drop-in with "sudo visudo -f /etc/sudoers.d/sn1per-mcp" containing this 'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Root, or a trusted sudo whose passwordless rule allows the CLI (L.2, D.5).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["bin/tool"], cwd=str(c_dir), check=True, timeout=60,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# so the not_root refusal (SNIPER_NEEDS_SUDO=false, not root) shows not_checked: sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.'Add a sudoers drop-in with "sudo visudo -f /etc/sudoers.d/sn1per-mcp" containing this 'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "sniper_mcp", "--version"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(command, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert subprocess.run([realpaths.TRUE_BIN], check=False).returncode == 0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."empty-entry": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"them from a shell with: sudo kill {listed}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-I", "-c", "pass"], env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return text + (f" (or their whole sessions with: sudo pkill -TERM -s {groups})"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."fork_exec outside an approved subprocess.Popen (multiprocessing, a direct "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.'Add a sudoers drop-in with "sudo visudo -f /etc/sudoers.d/sn1per-mcp" containing this 'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen(["bin/tool"], cwd=str(a_dir), preexec_fn=lambda: os.chdir(c_dir))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.execv(realpaths.TRUE_BIN, [realpaths.TRUE_BIN])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["tool"], env=env, check=False, timeout=60, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN, realpaths.SNIPER_SHARE_CLI])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return ToolError("cli_untrusted", "The Sn1per CLI is not owned by root, so a sudo "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system("true")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen([realpaths.SUDO_BIN, "-n", "true"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "pass"], env={"PATH": "/nonexistent"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."dot-relative-entry": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(["tool"], env={"PATH": f"{iso.tmp / 'A' / 'bin'}:"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.child = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "pass"], cwd=str(iso.tmp),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."shell: sudo sniper -w {workspace} -d")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, *argv], env=iso.child_env())Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.posix_spawn(realpaths.TRUE_BIN, [realpaths.TRUE_BIN], {})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "sniper_mcp"], env=env, input="",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "--check-hash-based-pycs", "default", "-c", code],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.to exec (a missing interpreter, no shebang) would fall through to theFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.f"{problem}.", f"sudo chmod go-w {path}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.child = subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN], cwd=str(iso.tmp), start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."str-and-bytes-path": lambda: subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."n3c-path-like-argument-fork-exec": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."bytes-subclass-argument": lambda: subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([grep, "-c", "ran", secret], close_fds=False,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([grep, "-c", "ran", pathlib.PosixPath(inside)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", _OUTSIDE_PROBE, str(outside),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."path-like-argument": lambda: subprocess.Popen([true_bin, _PathLike(str(iso.tmp))]),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."link-through-proc-self-cwd": lambda: subprocess.run([link], cwd="/", timeout=30),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([grep, "-c", "ran", "/proc/self/fd/0/" + relative + "/tool"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([stub, "pathlib"], cwd=iso.tmp, check=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."environb": lambda: subprocess.Popen([true_bin], env=os.environb),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."path-like-cwd": lambda: subprocess.Popen([true_bin], cwd=_PathLike(str(iso.tmp))),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."int-value": lambda: subprocess.Popen([true_bin], env={**path, "X": 1}),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.patch_environ_decodevalue(once(lambda: os.system(mark + " x6")))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."grep-reads-through-thread-self-cwd-dotdot": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."n3s-path-like-argument-posix-spawn": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda fd: subprocess.run(["/proc/self/fd/0"], stdin=fd, timeout=30))),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."grep-reads-through-proc-self-cwd": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"run = subprocess.run([{mark!r}, {name!r}], timeout=30).returncode\\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([grep, "-c", "ran", poisoned(inside, secret)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return os.system(mark + " x1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."proc-self-cwd-path-entry": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: with_fd(outside_bin, lambda fd: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."grep-reads-through-proc-self-cwd-dotdot": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f" run = subprocess.run([{mark!r}, {tag!r}], timeout=30).returncode\\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([sys.executable, *flags, "-c", code], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.done = subprocess.run([sys.executable, *flags, "-c", code], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", _DIVERGENCE_PROBE, str(outside),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return os.system(mark + " x1r")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."preexec-with-cwd": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([grep, "-c", "ran", poisoned(inside, secret)], cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."path-like-executable": lambda: subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return os.posix_spawn(true, [Shown("x")], {})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."proc-self-cwd-executable": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."preexec-partial": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."dict-subclass": lambda: subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."preexec-chdir-sudo": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."proc-thread-self-cwd-executable": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return os.posix_spawn(true, [Hidden("x")], {})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.system(mark + " x7")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run([str(stub), "posix-spawn-shape"], close_fds=False, check=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], cwd=iso.tmp, env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.system(mark + " " + attack[:3].rstrip("-"))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run([os.fsencode(str(stub)), b"bytes"], env=os.environ, check=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.child = subprocess.Popen([sleep, "30"], cwd=root)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([true], env=os.environ, cwd=root, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([grep, "-c", "ran", secret], cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."grep-reads-through-a-link-then-dotdot": lambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."str-subclass-argument": lambda: subprocess.Popen([true_bin, _Str("x")]),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([true], env=os.environ, cwd=root, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""The ``cli_untrusted`` hint (C.2 step 1): chown only a file root placed."""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.lambda: subprocess.Popen(["tool"], cwd=str(iso.tmp),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"them from a shell with: sudo kill {listed}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.seen = subprocess.run([str(stub)], cwd=str(iso.tmp), capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", _SUBVERSION_PROBE, attack, str(outside),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen(["tool"], cwd=str(iso.tmp), env={"PATH": via_cwd}),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([via_stdin]),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([str(stub)], cwd=via_stdin),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN, os.path.join(via_cwd, "tool")]),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"them with: kill -9 {listed}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.control = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], cwd=str(iso.tmp),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN, argument])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN, os.path.join(via_stdin, "tool")]),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."not group- or world-writable. Do not chown the current file to root: other local "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.lambda: subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.child = subprocess.Popen([realpaths.SLEEP_BIN, "30"], start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([os.path.join(proc, "self", "root", str(stub).lstrip("/"))]),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([{realpaths.SUDO_BIN!r}, "-n", "true"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.posix_spawn(sys.executable, argv, env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "pass"], env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([str(named_sudo)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN], env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.unseen = subprocess.run([str(stub)], cwd=str(iso.tmp), capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"{problem}.", f"sudo chmod go-w {path}")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.done_run = subprocess.run([grep, "", "secret.txt"], env=os.environ,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN, os.path.join(str(link_dir), "..", "x")]),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([str(path), *args], env=env, cwd="/", capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.child = subprocess.Popen(argv, cwd=str(iso.tmp), start_new_session=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([os.path.join(via_cwd, "tool")], cwd=str(iso.tmp)),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.posix_spawn(sys.executable, argv, {"PATH": realpaths.MINIMAL_ENV_PATH})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([str(stub)], cwd=os.path.join(via_cwd, "..")),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", code], cwd=str(iso.tmp), env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f" subprocess.Popen([{realpaths.SUDO_BIN!r}, '-n', 'true'])\\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", CODE, planter], env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN, str(link)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], env=env, capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([realpaths.SUDO_BIN, "-n", "true"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return f"sudo chown root:root {self.realpath}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(argv, env=env, close_fds=False, capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lambda: subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# The chown hint names the path only when root placed the file (C.2 step 1).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.lambda: subprocess.Popen([realpaths.TRUE_BIN, "-r", "-c", "x", top_level_loot],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Until the holder's sudo has started the 11.x-shaped stub: stub sudo, the stubFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Plugins run inside the Sn1per MCP Server process with the same user, the same sudo "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# O.5 P1-04 / L.6: no test ever runs the engine's task deletion (-dt) or a killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(["http://user:[email protected]/", "http://@app.example/"], "invalid_target"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("stealth", "http://192.0.2.10/", None),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."""D.5: resolved once; a sudo that appears on PATH later is not picked up."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return f"executable {exe_path!r} names a real Sn1per or sudo binary", NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.for refused in (results.failure("sniper_scan", "cli_untrusted", "m", f"chown {path}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.stub sudo relays SIGTERM to its direct child only, and the pipeline body survives."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Scanning off: no sudo preflight, so no stub records the undecodable argv.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("\uff11\uff19\uff12\uff0e\uff10\uff0e\uff12\uff0e\uff11\uff10", "192.0.2.10", targets.IPV4),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."""S2 fix round 2: the cli_untrusted hint was always "sudo chown root:rootFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."""After the timeout kill, a process the kill cannot reach (a root engine under sudo)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo = ["/usr/bin/sudo", "-n", "--"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("1.2http://u:[email protected]", "1.2http://u:[REDACTED:password]@h.app.example"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("\uff11\uff19\uff12\uff0e\uff10\uff0e\uff12\uff0e\uff11\uff10", "192.0.2.10"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."credentials/pairs.txt": "excluded", "output/dc.kirbi": "excluded",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.add(Sample(28, "secret", "[+] http://192.0.2.10/?apikey=" + "k6" * 8, ("k6" * 8,)))Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."\uff11\uff12\uff17\uff0e\uff10\uff0e\uff10\uff0e\uff10\uff58\uff11"],Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.# protected root (for example ~/.ssh) would widen strict mode (O.7).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert ctx.sanitize("a\x1b[31mb") == "ab<U+202E>"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."""sudo gets a controlling terminal (the condition for use_pty), and the holderFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert record["pid"] not in outcome.remaining_pids # sudo itself went awayFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert payload["error"]["hint"] == f"sudo chown root:root {iso.cli_path}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# (Community Edition after a scan, whose init runs chmod 777 -Rf on it) any local userFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return f"argv element {element!r} names a real Sn1per or sudo binary", NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.add(Sample(28, "secret", "[+] http://192.0.2.10/?apikey=" + "k6" * 8, ("k6" * 8,)))Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.# --- INCIDENT row (4): stub sudo and stub CLIs exit 97 outside the temp root ------Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""H.5: not_needed means running as root; a non-root no-sudo server is not_checked."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""S2 fix round 2: the cli_untrusted hint was always "sudo chown root:rootFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Golden argv for every mode of both dialects runs through the stub sudo andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert found == ["deep/a/b/c.txt", "nmap/nmap-app.example.txt", "output/notes.txt"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."""Behaviour knobs read by the stub CLI and stub sudo (O.3); replaces the defaults."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.root-owned, the file the sudo rule then runs as root. The chown hint is given onlyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.real_chmod = os.chmodFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert iso.calls() == [] # not even the sudo preflight (F.9 step 9 precedes step 10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."http://192.0.2.10 [200 OK] Country[RESERVED][ZZ], HTML5, HTTPServer[nginx/1.29.7], "Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."""The 11.x CLI runs its scan body in a subshell piped to tee. With a terminal, sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Root placed the file, but it belongs to someone else: chown is the fix.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert "names a real Sn1per or sudo binary" in record.violations[0].detailFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."http://192.0.2.10 [200 OK] Country[RESERVED][ZZ], HTML5, HTTPServer[nginx/1.29.7], "Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.("stealth", "http://192.0.2.10/", None),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.root inside a protected root (for example ~/.ssh) would widen strict mode."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(f"[+] http://192.0.2.10/?apikey={SECRET}", "[+] http://192.0.2.10/?apikey=[REDACTED:secret]"),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert payload["error"]["hint"] == f"sudo chown root:root {iso.cli_path}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.root-owned, the file the sudo rule then runs as root. The chown hint is given onlyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.candidate, so a later PATH entry (a real sudo or sniper on a host) never runs.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(f"[+] http://192.0.2.10/?apikey={SECRET}", "[+] http://192.0.2.10/?apikey=[REDACTED:secret]"),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert d.engine_path_hint() == f"sudo ln -s {iso.cli_path} /usr/local/bin/sniper"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# The inner session's blocked sudo is also written to the child file belowFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.The Sn1per MCP Server lets an AI agent launch active security scans. Scans send traffic to the target, can be intrusive, and run with root privileges through sudo.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.… return a job handle immediately; the scan keeps running in the background with root privileges and sends traffic to the target. Only call this for targets the operator has e…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.(["http://-o/etc/passwd"], "invalid_target"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(["/", "/etc/passwd"], "invalid_target"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…or a passwordless sudo rule for the Sn1per CLI. That rule is equivalent to full root access for the user it names; read the [security model](https://github.com/1N3/sn1per-…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.(["-oN/tmp/x", "-iL/etc/shadow", "-osniper", "-", "-d"], "invalid_target"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.@pytest.mark.parametrize("target", ["-iL/etc/shadow", "-oN/tmp/x", "\uff0diL/etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… **Warning:** a passwordless sudo rule for the Sn1per CLI is equivalent to full root access for the user it names. The CLI reads configuration files as root and Sn1per Com…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- The passwordless sudo rule for the Sn1per CLI is equivalent to full root access for that user.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.…ent.** A passwordless sudo rule for the Sn1per CLI gives the user it names full root access, because the CLI sources arbitrary files as root (its configuration files and, …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sn1per-mcp@0.9.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 1n3: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- OS command execution function call detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.