Skills/PyPI/sn-patterns-mcp

sn-patterns-mcp@0.3.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "ServiceNow Discovery pattern intelligence MCP server — Python NDL parser/writer + 28 MCP tools (read, search, validate, author, surgical-edit, emulate)" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher hans6883 · publishing for 179 daysInstalls 47Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SN_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: SN_INSTANCE, SN_PATTERNS_CHROMA_DIR, SN_PATTERNS_DEBUG, SN_PATTERNS_INDEX_ROOT, SN_PATTERNS_LOG_LEVEL, SN_TARGET_EMU_DEBUG, SN_TARGET_EMU_LOG_LEVEL, SN_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso service-now.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security_guards.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert not _looks_like_sysid("../etc/passwd" + "0" * 19)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_target_emulator_ber.py:120 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsassert raw == b"\x41\x05\x00\x80\x00\x00\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_target_emulator_ber.py:103 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsassert raw == b"\x40\x04\x0a\x00\x00\x01"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsn_patterns_mcp/closures/registry.py:457 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"Switch the SSH/command session to a different user (sudo su) for subsequent steps.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security_guards.py:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"sys_id": "../etc/passwd", "name": "evil", "ndl": "library {name = \"x\"}"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈76 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sn-patterns-mcp@0.3.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hans6883: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Hex-encoded string detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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