Skills/PyPI/smriti-kaal-mcp

smriti-kaal-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Smriti — Temporal AI Memory for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, and Windsurf" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher remanenetspy · publishing for 47 daysInstalls 60Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add smriti-kaal-mcp -- uvx smriti-kaal-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SMRITI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SMRITI_BASE_URL, SMRITI_MAX_RESULTS, SMRITI_MAX_RETRIES, SMRITI_PARSE_SVO, SMRITI_SCOPE, SMRITI_SOURCE_ID, SMRITI_SUPABASE_URL, SMRITI_TIMEOUT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso hf.space — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names hf.space as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SMRITI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx smriti-kaal-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_mcp_server.py:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)mcp/server.py:630 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server.run(transport="sse", port=port)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 23 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for smriti-kaal-mcp@0.1.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.