Skills/PyPI/smokeball-mcp

smokeball-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Smokeball API — full coverage for law firm practice management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher rosenadvertising · publishing for 194 daysInstalls 72Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add smokeball-mcp -- uvx smokeball-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SMOKEBALL_API_KEYSMOKEBALL_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: SMOKEBALL_CLIENT_ID, SMOKEBALL_REGION
Where it talks to
smokeball.com, smokeball.com.au, smokeball.co.uk (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SMOKEBALL_API_KEY, SMOKEBALL_CLIENT_SECRET and talks to smokeball.com, smokeball.com.au, smokeball.co.uk. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets SMOKEBALL_API_KEY=smokeball.com,SMOKEBALL_CLIENT_SECRET=smokeball.com -- uvx smokeball-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmokeball_mcp/credentials.py:93 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Parse the 0600 ``.env`` fallback file into a dict (empty if absent)."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmokeball_mcp/credentials.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesStorage order (write): OS keyring (falls back to the 0600 .env file only whenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmokeball_mcp/credentials.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThe file fallback keeps the historical chmod-0600 ``.env`` behaviour so theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_help.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed Python command, isolated environmentFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmokeball_mcp/setup/oauth_flow.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesService), falling back to a 0600 ``.env`` file when no keyring backend isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmokeball_mcp/client.py:171 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Resolve credentials through the pluggable store (OS keyring -> .env file).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmokeball_mcp/credentials.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesENV_FILE = CONFIG_DIR / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_daybreak_security.py:192 · Python subprocess execution detectedprobe = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmokeball_mcp/credentials.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesStorage order (read): OS keyring -> process env -> ~/.smokeball-mcp/.env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:116 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://192.0.2.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded URLtests/test_daybreak_security.py:99 · Hex-encoded URL — attempt to bypass URL filtering"https://0x7f.0.0.1/",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:116 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://192.0.2.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_daybreak_security.py:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert not (tmp_path / ".env").exists()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:117 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://224.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_spec_2026_07_28.py:98 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_daybreak_security.py:92 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:117 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://224.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_round2_security.py:205 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.pre-commit-config.yaml:101 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeentry: npx --no-install eslint --fixFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tool_errors.py:444 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestarget = config / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_windows_secret_files.py:156 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestarget = config / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:114 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"https://169.254.169.254/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:113 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"https://10.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:115 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://100.64.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_daybreak_security.py:115 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://100.64.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded URLtests/test_daybreak_security.py:95 · Hex-encoded URL — attempt to bypass URL filtering"https://0x7f000001/",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_daybreak_security.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestarget = tmp_path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for smokeball-mcp@0.2.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.