Skills/PyPI/simplenote-mcp-server

simplenote-mcp-server@1.18.4

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A simple MCP Server that connects to Simplenote" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher thomas-juul-dyhr-docdyhr · publishing for 265 daysInstalls 494Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ALERT_SMTP_PASSWORDALERT_WEBHOOK_SECRETALERT_WEBHOOK_URLSHTTP_ENDPOINT_AUTH_TOKENMCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENSESSION_SECRET_KEYSIMPLENOTE_PASSWORDSIMPLENOTE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ALERT_EMAIL_FROM, ALERT_EMAIL_TO, ALERT_SMTP_HOST, ALERT_SMTP_PORT, ALERT_SMTP_SSL, ALERT_SMTP_USER, CACHE_HEALTH_CHECKS_ENABLED, CACHE_INITIALIZATION_TIMEOUT, CACHE_MAX_SIZE, DEFAULT_RESOURCE_LIMIT, ENABLE_HTTP_ENDPOINT, HTTP_HEALTH_PATH, HTTP_HOST, HTTP_METRICS_PATH, HTTP_PORT, HTTP_READY_PATH, LOG_FORMAT, LOG_TO_FILE, LOGLEVEL, MCP_DEBUG, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_PATH, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_TRANSPORT, METRICS_COLLECTION_INTERVAL, RATE_LIMIT_BURST, RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS, SIMPLENOTE_EMAIL
Where it talks to
simplenote.com (its own)Also simperium.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names simperium.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ALERT_SMTP_PASSWORD, ALERT_WEBHOOK_SECRET, ALERT_WEBHOOK_URLS, HTTP_ENDPOINT_AUTH_TOKEN, MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN, SESSION_SECRET_KEY, SIMPLENOTE_PASSWORD, SIMPLENOTE_TOKEN only into requests to simplenote.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ALERT_SMTP_PASSWORD=simplenote.com,ALERT_WEBHOOK_SECRET=simplenote.com,ALERT_WEBHOOK_URLS=simplenote.com,HTTP_ENDPOINT_AUTH_TOKEN=simplenote.com,MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN=simplenote.com,SESSION_SECRET_KEY=simplenote.com,SIMPLENOTE_PASSWORD=simplenote.com,SIMPLENOTE_TOKEN=simplenote.com -- uvx simplenote-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collects environment variables by secret-like names; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/cleanup_servers.sh:38 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsimplenote_mcp/scripts/generate_test_coverage.py:135 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=verbose == 0)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/cleanup_servers.sh:24 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM $SERVER_PIDFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namessimplenote_mcp/server/server.py:1609 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesfor key, value in os.environ.items():Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/restart_claude.sh:33 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsimplenote_mcp/server/keychain.py:84 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsimplenote_mcp/server/security.py:57 · Remote installer piped to shellr"(`(rm|cat|ls|chmod|wget|curl|bash|sh|whoami|id|echo|pwd)[^`]*`)", # Backticks with dangerous commandsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/cleanup_servers.sh:92 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# If we've reached the max wait time, proceed to force killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsimplenote_mcp/scripts/diagnose_api.py:430 · Python subprocess execution detectedoutput = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsimplenote_mcp/server/security.py:55 · Remote installer piped to shellr"(\$\w+;\s*(rm|cat|ls|chmod|wget|curl|bash|sh))",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsimplenote_mcp/server/security.py:58 · Remote installer piped to shellr"(\|\s*(rm|cat|ls|chmod|wget|curl|bash|sh|whoami|id)(\s+|$))",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsimplenote_mcp/server/security.py:59 · Remote installer piped to shellr"(&&\s*(rm|cat|ls|chmod|wget|curl|bash|sh)(\s+|$))",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssimplenote_mcp/server/security.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|/proc/)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/cleanup_servers.sh:35 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Force kill if still runningFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsimplenote_mcp/server/security.py:54 · Remote installer piped to shellr"(;\s*(rm|cat|ls|chmod|wget|curl|bash|sh|whoami|id)(\s+|$))",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/restart_claude.sh:19 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM $SERVER_PIDFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/restart_claude.sh:30 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Force kill if still runningFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsimplenote_mcp/scripts/diagnose_api.py:424 · Python subprocess execution detectedoutput = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsimplenote_mcp/scripts/cleanup_servers.sh:69 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM $PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingsimplenote_mcp/scripts/generate_test_coverage.py:86 · Dynamic module loadingspec = importlib.util.find_spec("pytest_cov")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for simplenote-mcp-server@1.18.4 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim thomas-juul-dyhr-docdyhr: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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