Skills/PyPI/simba-mcp

simba-mcp@0.18.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Simba Marketing Mix Modeling — connect AI assistants to your MMM models" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher getsimba-ai · publishing for 227 daysInstalls 421Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add simba-mcp -- uvx simba-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_OAUTH_ENABLEDSIMBA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SIMBA_API_REQUEST_POLICY_JSON, SIMBA_API_URL, SIMBA_MCP_ALLOW_LOCAL_FILES, SIMBA_MCP_METRICS, SIMBA_PUBLIC_URL, SIMBA_TOOL_DESCRIPTIONS, SIMBA_TOOL_PROFILE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso simba-mmm.com, calendly.com, synthetic.invalid, x.ai, evaluation.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names simba-mmm.com, calendly.com, synthetic.invalid, x.ai, evaluation.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED, SIMBA_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx simba-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/simba_mcp/configuration.py:560 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"A development `.env` configures only the process that loads it. It does not",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/simba_mcp/performance.py:186 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprint(f"Wrote surface.json and surface.md to {args.output_dir}")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/simba_mcp/benchmark.py:209 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprint(f"Wrote overhead.json and overhead.md to {args.output_dir}")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/simba_mcp/configuration.py:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"lifecycle": "Read at lifespan start. Restart to change. A development .env configures only the process that loads it.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/simba_mcp/tools/models.py:648 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesis time to the stale-heartbeat threshold, not fit ETA or an exact kill time.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/simba_mcp/measurements.py:44 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/simba_mcp/measurements.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedrevision = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,532 tok
6 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for simba-mcp@0.18.0 as of 30 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.