sibyl-memory-mcp@0.4.2
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for Sibyl Memory Plugin: wraps the local SQLite + FTS5 memory engine and exposes it to MCP-compatible agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Continue, anything that speaks MCP)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SIBYL_CREDENTIALSConfiguration, not credentials: FASTMCP_LOG_LEVEL, SIBYL_MEMORY_DB, SIBYL_MEMORY_INSTRUCTIONS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso sibyllabs.org, claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names sibyllabs.org, claude.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SIBYL_CREDENTIALS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.4.1
vet-skills diff sibyl-memory-mcp 0.4.1 0.4.2In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.4.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# or credentials.json appeared / disappeared (post-init / post-logout),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# ignored when the dir already exists, so chmod belt-and-suspenders to coverFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sibyl-memory-mcp@0.4.2 as of 38 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.