Skills/PyPI/shrike-mcp

shrike-mcp@0.4.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Anki collection management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher lathrys-at · publishing for 169 daysInstalls 57Last detonated 58 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso huggingface.co, ankiweb.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx shrike-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Sends the whole process environment out. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/shrike/embedding.py:105 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# Raw passthrough token strings (each shlex-split at command-build time).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shrike/collection.py:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesStrips any directory components, so ``../../etc/passwd`` becomes ``passwd`` andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Sends the whole process environment outsrc/shrike/embedding.py:126 · Sends the whole process environment outPriority: explicit override (--llama-server) > LLAMA_SERVER_PATH env > PATH.Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/shrike/cli/config.py:157 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"""Passthrough token strings via flag → env → config (flag wins).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_media.py:584 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[{"kind": "redirect", "location": "file:///etc/passwd"}],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/run.py:251 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, check=True, cwd=str(HERE))Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/judge.py:142 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_media.py:512 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name{"kind": "redirect", "location": "https://1.1.1.1/secure"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shrike/index.py:52 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# hard kill without re-embedding the whole collection.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_media.py:431 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringdef _run(self, monkeypatch, script, *, url="http://1.1.1.1/start", **kw):Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandCLAUDE.md:342 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…on clean stop). If Shrike is hard-killed (SIGKILL, incl. the daemon's own force-kill path), llama-server is orphaned and keeps holding its port. On the next `start()…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_media.py:512 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering{"kind": "redirect", "location": "https://1.1.1.1/secure"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shrike/embedding.py:232 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processessignals (alive and on our port) so a recycled PID can't make us kill anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_media.py:431 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot namedef _run(self, monkeypatch, script, *, url="http://1.1.1.1/start", **kw):Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandCLAUDE.md:362 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes… flush is driven by edit activity. This bounds how much incremental work a hard kill / crash discards: once a flush lands and the server goes idle, the on-disk index…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_media.py:491 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files["file:///etc/passwd", "gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO", "dict://127.0.0.1/", "ftp://x/"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/unit/test_media.py:81 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target[{"url": "http://10.0.0.1/x.png"}], allow_private_fetch=FalseFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/run.py:108 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(["bash", str(LAUNCH)], capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=str(ROOT))Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/unit/test_daemon.py:18 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Patch the side-effecting helpers; record SIGTERM / force-kill / cleanup.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs/audits/audit-55f832d.md:221 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file…rip too, or document that they're file-only. (Decided: file-only — documented in CLAUDE.md's "Config file" section. `save_config` does not write `logging.*`.) ### 7.3 [MEDIUM] CLAUDE.md claims "Periodic index save" is done,…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shrike/daemon.py:231 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# 3. Force kill as last resortFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/shrike/cli/server_cmd.py:419 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_media.py:461 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering{"kind": "redirect", "location": "http://1.0.0.1/a"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/unit/test_media.py:461 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name{"kind": "redirect", "location": "http://1.0.0.1/a"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shrike/tools.py:694 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Schedule a debounced flush so a hard kill while idleFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/run.py:255 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([PY, str(HARNESS), "report", "--batch", str(batch)], check=True, cwd=str(HERE))Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/shrike/embedding.py:299 · Python subprocess execution detectedself._process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/run.py:117 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/shrike/client.py:869 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageCLAUDE.md:202 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…nts: a native client reaches Shrike through the **`mcp-remote` stdio bridge** (`npx mcp-remote http://127.0.0.1:8372/mcp --allow-http --transport http-only`), which connects …Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_media.py:365 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[("../../etc/passwd", "passwd"), ("a/b/c.png", "c.png"), ("..", ""), ("", "")],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_media.py:206 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresults = await wrapper.fetch_media(["../../etc/passwd"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shrike/daemon.py:4 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesWhen the server exits — cleanly or via crash/kill — the OS releases the lock.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/unit/test_media.py:462 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials{"kind": "redirect", "location": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/run.py:197 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionCLAUDE.md:350 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… list) are always correct. **Drift detection:** the index metadata (`index.meta.json`) stores `col_mod` — the value of `col.mod` (collection-level modification timestamp, milliseconds) at the time the index was last built — and `model_id`,…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Bidirectional text override characters detectedsrc/shrike/tools.py:335 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content directionraise ToolInputError(str(e).replace("⁨", "").replace("⁩", "")) from eFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded URLtests/unit/test_media.py:338 · Hex-encoded URL — attempt to bypass URL filtering"literal", ["http://2130706433/", "http://0x7f000001/", "http://127.1/"]Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/harness.py:40 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/unit/test_version.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/qa/eval/run.py:225 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([PY, str(HARNESS), "baseline", "--out", str(run_dir)], check=True, cwd=str(HERE))Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shrike/embedding.py:230 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesSIGKILLed (including by its own force-kill path) before it could stop theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈19,971 tok
2 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for shrike-mcp@0.4.0 as of 38 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lathrys-at: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Sends the whole process environment out≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  5. Bidirectional text override characters detected≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim lathrys-atPropose a patch to the maintainer