shared-skills-registry-mcp@0.1.0a2
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "A self-hosted registry and MCP server for reusable AI-agent skills" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SSR_MCP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SSR_MCP_ALLOW_SKILLS_ROOT_OVERRIDE, SSR_MCP_AUDIT_LOG, SSR_MCP_BIND, SSR_MCP_PORT, SSR_MCP_SHARED_SKILL_CONTENT_ROOTS, SSR_MCP_SHARED_SKILLS, SSR_MCP_SKILLS_ROOT, SSR_MCP_URL, XDG_STATE_HOME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
…y beneath the adapter-configured `SSR_MCP_SKILLS_ROOT`. Model-supplied per-call root overrides are rejected by default. The repository-relative `client/stdio_server.py` rema…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.…he previous installation when possible. - Missing root configuration, attempted root override, checksum failure, path escape, and frontmatter mismatch fail closed. Local ins…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.if [[ -n "${server_pid:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if ! kill -0 "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$server_pid" || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…eats its configured `SSR_MCP_SKILLS_ROOT` as authoritative and rejects per-call root overrides by default. ### Skill author or upstream source Skill content is untrusted i…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.if [[ -n "${server_pid:-}" ]] && kill -0 "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…en a trusted caller must select a per-call local root; otherwise model-supplied root overrides are rejected. | | `PYTHONPATH` | legacy raw-script use only | Set to the repo …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Print a fresh SSR bearer token as a ready-to-paste .env line."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.kill "$server_pid" || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for shared-skills-registry-mcp@0.1.0a2 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cobibean: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.