shadow-mcp@0.2.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Discover and risk-grade the MCP servers actually present on this machine. Local-first shadow-MCP inventory." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``url``), ``args``, ``enabled``, and a nested ``[mcp_servers.<name>.env]`` table.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."npx ",Fix: Rename the tool with a prefix unique to your server.``https://h/mcp?token=XYZ``, ``https://user:pass@h``). A security tool must notFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert scrub_url("https://user:pass@h/mcp") == "https://user:REDACTED@h/mcp"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# 3. a package run: `npx @scope/pkg`, `uvx pkg`, or `... run pkg`Fix: Rename the tool with a prefix unique to your server." 789 88920 npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-github\n"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# Launcher shims that wrap the real owner (`uv run python ...`, `npx ...`, aFix: Rename the tool with a prefix unique to your server.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for shadow-mcp@0.2.0 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.