Skills/PyPI/serverasmcp

serverasmcp@0.4.6

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that gives AI agents unrestricted root SSH access to unlimited Linux servers. Execute any command, deploy files, configure Cloudflare DNS, and self-heal deployments." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher akillv · publishing for 69 daysInstalls 92Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx serverasmcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:562 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesremotePath: /opt/app/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:475 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions| `Permission denied` | `chmod +x /opt/app/index.js` or check file permissions |Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:472 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes| `EADDRINUSE` | `kill $(lsof -t -i:3000)` then restart |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:548 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesIf the project has a `.env.example` or requires environment variables:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:551 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files2. Create a `.env` file on the server:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:176 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:166 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash - && apt-get install -y nodejsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:166 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_20.x | bash - && apt-get install -y nodejsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:176 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:566 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. Ensure the systemd service loads them (add `EnvironmentFile=/opt/app/.env` to the service file)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:478 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| `ECONNREFUSED` | Port mismatch. Check `.env` file for PORT variable. |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:302 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileThis tool gives AI agents **unrestricted root access** to your servers. This is by design.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/mcp_deploy_server/skills/server-as-mcp/SKILL.md:286 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code| Static site | Serve with `npx serve` or nginx |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:115 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileThat's it. Your agent now has root access to all configured servers.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:5 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file**Give your AI agents unrestricted root access to unlimited Linux servers — via MCP.**Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,010 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for serverasmcp@0.4.6 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim akillv: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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