Skills/PyPI/serial-console-mcp

serial-console-mcp@0.3.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "AI for the configuration of telecommunication equipment over its serial console: Juniper and Cisco routers and switches, Icom CI-V and Kenwood, Yaesu and Elecraft CAT transceivers, and GS-232 antenna rotators, plus any other serial device in raw, ANSI or VT100 mode: IoT gateways, alarm and control panels, instruments. An MCP server for Claude and other AI assistants." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sbrunner-atx · publishing for 144 daysInstalls 690Last detonated 39 h ago
$claude mcp add serial-console-mcp -- uvx serial-console-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx serial-console-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_serial_console.py:355 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsp.feed(b"\x00\x50\x42\x14\x00\xfd", delay=0.4)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanduninstall_macos.sh:12 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo pkgutil --forget org.stefanbrunner.serialconsolemcp 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandbuild_macos.sh:33 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "pkgroot${INSTALL_LOCATION}/$APP_NAME"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanduninstall_macos.sh:2 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Run as your normal user (it will prompt for sudo for the file removal).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/serial_console_mcp/server.py:577 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([lsof, "-F", "pcn", port], capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandbuild_macos.sh:34 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x scripts/postinstallFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanduninstall_macos.sh:11 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo rm -rf "$INSTALL_DIR"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,409 tok
3 files · 29 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for serial-console-mcp@0.3.3 as of 38 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.