semlayer@0.7.0b8
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Semantic layer inference engine for data warehouses, with an openly licensed format" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYPG_DSNSNOWFLAKE_AUTHENTICATORSNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSPHRASESNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: CODEX_HOME, COPILOT_HOME, GCP_PROJECT, MESSY_SCALE, PG_ROLE, PGDATABASE, SEMLAYER_HOME, SEMLAYER_TELEMETRY, SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT, SNOWFLAKE_DATABASE, SNOWFLAKE_HOME, SNOWFLAKE_ROLE, SNOWFLAKE_WAREHOUSE- Where it talks to
- semlayer.dev (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, PG_DSN, SNOWFLAKE_AUTHENTICATOR, SNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSPHRASE, SNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH and talks to semlayer.dev. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
variables, `$SEMLAYER_HOME/.env`, dbt's profiles.yml and Snowflake'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Connect using .env credentials; persona 'reader' (product) or 'admin'.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.flag, else `SEMLAYER_MODEL` in the `.env` file, else the cheap tier.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.`--model` and the MCP server picks up from the same `.env` file the API keyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""The `.env` file this module is about: `$SEMLAYER_HOME/.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""The `.env` file the agent prescribes lines in. Re-read on every call.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.prescribe -- is a file: `$SEMLAYER_HOME/.env`, default `~/.semlayer/.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.A `.env` here is the user's own file in their own home directory, so it isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"{CHEAP_MODEL}; SEMLAYER_MODEL in $SEMLAYER_HOME/.env is the "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."(repeatable). Doc text IS sent to the LLM — don't pass secrets. "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""The `.env` file semlayer reads, and the only way its values reach a run.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."their environment, their `.env` file, their dbt profile, or their "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# names for the same thing, and the `.env` line to prescribe when a credentialFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- LLM-implausible kills the candidate; the kill is recorded (provenance ofFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""The model key, from the `.env` file or the environment.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.The `.env` file is applied for the duration of the open and takenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.its old name used to kill the whole drift run.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.-- mkdir -p ~/.snowflake/keys && chmod 700 ~/.snowflake/keysFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return importlib.util.find_spec(module) is not NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name"], cwd=Path(doc_path).resolve().parent,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""The process environment with `$SEMLAYER_HOME/.env` layered on top.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r = subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.survives to the accept/review/kill decision (best_for_child).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for semlayer@0.7.0b8 as of 54 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim semlayer-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.