semcod-mcp@0.1.7
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Initialize semcod MCP stack integration for Cursor, VS Code, Claude and other IDEs — init, doctor, validate, analyze." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYGH_TOKENGITHUB_PATGITHUB_TOKENOPENAI_API_KEYSEMCOD_MCP_API_KEYWEBUI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: DASHBOARD_PORT, GATEWAY_URL, GH2MCP_URL, GIT_PROXY_URL, LLM_PROVIDER, MCP_DOCS_ROOT, MCP_SKILLS_HTTP_HOST, MCP_SKILLS_HTTP_PORT, MCP_SKILLS_TRANSPORT, OLLAMA_HOST, OPENWEBUI_URL, PORT_GATEWAY, PORT_OPENWEBUI, SEMCOD_MCP_GATEWAY_URL, SEMCOD_MCP_STACK, SKILLS_REPO_BASE, SUBACTOR_CONTROL_DISCOVERED, SUBACTOR_CONTROL_URL, SUBACTOR_OPENWEBUI_CONNECTION_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for API_KEY, GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_PAT, GITHUB_TOKEN, OPENAI_API_KEY, SEMCOD_MCP_API_KEY, WEBUI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
if [ -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.cfg = EnvConfig(Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Porty z .env lub defaultsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.parser.add_argument("--env-file", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [ -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Porty z .env lub defaultsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Save to .env file using env2mcpFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.set -a; source "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env"; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(c, cwd=str(repo_path), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=request.timeout, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.ENV_FILE="$ROOT_DIR/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.local env_file="$ROOT_DIR/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [ ! -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.auto_update_config: trueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.set -a; source "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env"; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proxy_clone_url="https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/${full_name}.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.fetch = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.docker exec mcp-git-proxy sh -lc "rm -rf /git-repos/${repo_id}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo -e "${YELLOW}Creating .env file from example...${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sync = subparsers.add_parser("sync", help="Sync token to .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Read GitHub token from gh CLI (via env2mcp) and save to .env."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Porty z .env lub defaultsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.reset = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.@echo " make start - kill host ports, build and start full stack (with OpenWebUI)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$dest/$target" || return 1Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- GH2MCP_ENV_FILE=/app/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.&& rm -rf /tmp/env2mcpFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- ./.env:/app/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod 0644 "$output_file"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$dest/$target" || return 1Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.ifneq (,$(wildcard .env))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Load port variables from .env (fallback to defaults)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.analyses = list(OUTPUT_DIR.glob("*_analysis.json")) if OUTPUT_DIR.exists() else []Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# gh2mcp Agent - synchronizacja tokenu GitHub (gh CLI -> .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.url = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.include .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- ./.env:/app/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.&& rm -rf /tmp/env2mcp /tmp/gh2mcpFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.for pid in $$pids; do kill -TERM $$pid 2>/dev/null || true; done; \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.for pid in $$pids; do kill -9 $$pid 2>/dev/null || true; done; \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for semcod-mcp@0.1.7 as of 15 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim semcod-tom: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.