Skills/PyPI/semcod-mcp

semcod-mcp@0.1.7

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Initialize semcod MCP stack integration for Cursor, VS Code, Claude and other IDEs — init, doctor, validate, analyze." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher semcod-tom · publishing for 142 daysInstalls 93Last detonated 49 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEYGH_TOKENGITHUB_PATGITHUB_TOKENOPENAI_API_KEYSEMCOD_MCP_API_KEYWEBUI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: DASHBOARD_PORT, GATEWAY_URL, GH2MCP_URL, GIT_PROXY_URL, LLM_PROVIDER, MCP_DOCS_ROOT, MCP_SKILLS_HTTP_HOST, MCP_SKILLS_HTTP_PORT, MCP_SKILLS_TRANSPORT, OLLAMA_HOST, OPENWEBUI_URL, PORT_GATEWAY, PORT_OPENWEBUI, SEMCOD_MCP_GATEWAY_URL, SEMCOD_MCP_STACK, SKILLS_REPO_BASE, SUBACTOR_CONTROL_DISCOVERED, SUBACTOR_CONTROL_URL, SUBACTOR_OPENWEBUI_CONNECTION_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for API_KEY, GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_PAT, GITHUB_TOKEN, OPENAI_API_KEY, SEMCOD_MCP_API_KEY, WEBUI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx semcod-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp-webui/server.py:164 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescfg = EnvConfig(Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp-webui/server.py:273 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:945 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test.sh:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Porty z .env lub defaultsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsgh2mcp/gh2mcp/cli.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--env-file", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_demo_repos.sh:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Porty z .env lub defaultsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:1193 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp-webui/server.py:288 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Save to .env file using env2mcpFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy.sh:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesset -a; source "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env"; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:1226 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(c, cwd=str(repo_path), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=request.timeout, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_demo_repos.sh:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesENV_FILE="$ROOT_DIR/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/refactor-last-repo.sh:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslocal env_file="$ROOT_DIR/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy.sh:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:1017 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:964 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsgoal.yaml:281 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationgoal.yaml:259 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeauto_update_config: trueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:1251 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test.sh:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesset -a; source "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env"; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:955 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/generate_demo_repos.sh:319 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingproxy_clone_url="https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@github.com/${full_name}.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:1029 · Python subprocess execution detectedfetch = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/generate_demo_repos.sh:354 · Destructive file system command detecteddocker exec mcp-git-proxy sh -lc "rm -rf /git-repos/${repo_id}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy.sh:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho -e "${YELLOW}Creating .env file from example...${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:1322 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsgh2mcp/gh2mcp/cli.py:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessync = subparsers.add_parser("sync", help="Sync token to .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp-webui/server.py:314 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Read GitHub token from gh CLI (via env2mcp) and save to .env."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy.sh:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Porty z .env lub defaultsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp-skills/server.py:1041 · Python subprocess execution detectedreset = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp-webui/server.py:212 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:31 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes@echo " make start - kill host ports, build and start full stack (with OpenWebUI)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install-agent-hosts.sh:168 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$dest/$target" || return 1Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- GH2MCP_ENV_FILE=/app/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedmcp-webui/Dockerfile:9 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /tmp/env2mcpFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ./.env:/app/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandproject/readme.sh:124 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 0644 "$output_file"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install-agent-hosts.sh:219 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$dest/$target" || return 1Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesifneq (,$(wildcard .env))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load port variables from .env (fallback to defaults)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondashboard/server.py:100 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesanalyses = list(OUTPUT_DIR.glob("*_analysis.json")) if OUTPUT_DIR.exists() else []Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedgh2mcp/Dockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# gh2mcp Agent - synchronizacja tokenu GitHub (gh CLI -> .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsemcod_mcp/paths.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedurl = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinclude .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:160 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ./.env:/app/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedgh2mcp/Dockerfile:14 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /tmp/env2mcp /tmp/gh2mcpFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:72 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesfor pid in $$pids; do kill -TERM $$pid 2>/dev/null || true; done; \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsemcod_mcp/doctor.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandMakefile:74 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesfor pid in $$pids; do kill -9 $$pid 2>/dev/null || true; done; \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,364 tok
4 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for semcod-mcp@0.1.7 as of 15 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim semcod-tom: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim semcod-tomPropose a patch to the maintainer