Skills/PyPI/semantic-search-mcp

semantic-search-mcp@0.3.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for semantic code search using local embeddings" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher adam-hanna · publishing for 324 daysInstalls 92Last detonated 49 min ago
$claude mcp add semantic-search-mcp -- uvx semantic-search-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SEMANTIC_SEARCH_MAX_CHUNK_TOKENSConfiguration, not credentials: SEMANTIC_SEARCH_BATCH_SIZE, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_CHUNK_OVERLAP, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_DB_PATH, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_DEBOUNCE_MS, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_EMBEDDING_DIM, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_EMBEDDING_MODEL, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_EMBEDDING_THREADS, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_LIMIT, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_MAX_FILE_SIZE_KB, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_MIN_SCORE, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_QUEUE_MAX_SIZE, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_ROOT, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_RRF_K, SEMANTIC_SEARCH_USE_QUANTIZED
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SEMANTIC_SEARCH_MAX_CHUNK_TOKENS and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx semantic-search-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs/plans/2025-12-30-server-control-tools.md:1333 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file**Step 2: Update CLAUDE.md MCP Tools section**Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs/plans/2025-12-30-server-control-tools.md:1311 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file- Modify: `CLAUDE.md`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/semantic_search_mcp/embedder.py:341 · Destructive file system command detectedf"Try manually clearing: rm -rf /tmp/fastembed_cache ~/.cache/fastembed*\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs/plans/2025-12-30-server-control-tools.md:1335 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileUpdate the MCP Tools section in CLAUDE.md:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs/plans/2025-12-30-server-control-tools.md:1384 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filegit add README.md CLAUDE.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/semantic_search_mcp/gitignore.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,582 tok
8 files · 48 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for semantic-search-mcp@0.3.0 as of 15 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.