Skills/PyPI/selph-mcp

selph-mcp@1.5.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Selph MCP CLI — Claude Code onboarding helper for the Selph Remote MCP." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher selph-engineer · publishing for 206 daysInstalls 30Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SELPH_API_KEYSELPH_BEARER_TOKEN or --persist-api-key / --bearer-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: CHECKPOINT_POOL_MAX, CHROMA_CLEAR_AT_BOOT, CHROMA_HOST, CHROMA_PATH, CHROMA_PORT, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, SELPH_API_URL, SELPH_CLIENT_TIMEOUT, SELPH_CONSUMER_ID, SELPH_GET_FINGERPRINT_AVAILABLE, SELPH_KG_DB_POOL_MAX, SELPH_MCP_EXTRACTION_CONCURRENCY, SELPH_MCP_SSE_HOST, SELPH_MCP_SSE_PORT, SELPH_MCP_TRANSPORT, SELPH_OBSERVE_SYNC_BUDGET_MS, SELPH_OBSERVE_SYNC_BUDGET_SECS, SELPH_USER_ID
Where it talks to
selph.ai (its own)Also azurecontainerapps.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Sends the whole process environment out. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

LOW
Dynamic module loadingselph_mcp/server/__init__.py:46 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)_spec.loader.exec_module(_old_server_module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/bootstrap/_secure_io.py:72 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# chmod BEFORE replace so the public path never briefly exists atFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Sends the whole process environment outselph_mcp/bootstrap/cli/_legacy.py:53 · Sends the whole process environment out"""Argument > env > default."""Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/bootstrap/credentials.py:177 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"""Atomically write ``payload`` as JSON, chmod 0o600.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/bootstrap/credentials.py:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions``%USERPROFILE%\\.config\\selph-mcp\\credentials.json`` — chmod has noFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/skill/bootstrap/_cache.py:43 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"failed to chmod cache dir to 0700",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/skill/bootstrap/_cache.py:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# AND the ensure_cache_dir mkdir/chmod outside the workspace, even whenFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/skill/state_schema.py:10 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- ``credentials.json`` — credentials (separate; chmod 0600; never logged)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/bootstrap/credentials.py:43 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions:func:`save_credentials` — write+chmod 0o600, atomic.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedselph_mcp/skill/bootstrap/_paths.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/bootstrap/credentials.py:142 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrefusal the chmod 0o700 / 0o600 protections do not apply to theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/bootstrap/credentials.py:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionstoken. On Windows the chmod is a no-op (NTFS ACLs apply instead) — thatFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingselph_mcp/server/__init__.py:45 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.util.module_from_spec via alias)_old_server_module = _importlib_util.module_from_spec(_spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandselph_mcp/bootstrap/cli/_legacy.py:309 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsprint("The bearer_token has been written to that file (chmod 0600).")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesselph_mcp/bootstrap/cli/_dispatch.py:222 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filehelp="Append the Selph CLAUDE.md block (idempotent).")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for selph-mcp@1.5.0 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim selph-engineer: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Sends the whole process environment out≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim selph-engineerPropose a patch to the maintainer