seestar-mcp@0.2.0b0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for controlling SeestarS50 telescope" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso unistra.fr — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.log('📤 Sending: notifications/initialized');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`📤 Sending: ${method}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.&& curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.console.log('Sending: notifications/initialized');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log('Debug: Sending test request');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.chown -R seestar:seestar /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.| \.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.log('Sending:', request.trim());Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.&& curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for seestar-mcp@0.2.0b0 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim david-perez-david.perez: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.