Skills/PyPI/securitystack-mcp

securitystack-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Unified MCP server — give your AI agent the ability to secure its own environment." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 726 daysInstalls 46Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACTIVESCANNER_API_KEYDEPSCAN_API_KEYSECRETSCAN_API_BASESECRETSCAN_API_KEYSECURITYSCAN_API_KEYSECURITYSTACK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ACTIVESCANNER_API_BASE, DEPSCAN_API_BASE, SECURITYSCAN_API_BASE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso stripe.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 52/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellstack/mcp_audit.py:9 · Remote installer piped to shell3. Supply chain risk — unpinned npx/uvx package fetches, curl|bash installsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstack/mcp_audit.py:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSENSITIVE_PATHS = re.compile(r"(?i)(\.env|\.ssh|id_rsa|\.aws|\.config|credentials|\.npmrc|\.gitconfig)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternstack/mcp_audit.py:157 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codedetail="Instalación tipo 'curl | bash' — ejecuta código remoto sin verificación.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstack/mcp_audit.py:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("File exfiltration instruction", r"(?i)\b(read|cat|open|load).{0,40}(\.env|\.ssh|id_rsa|credentials|secrets?)\b", "critical"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellstack/mcp_audit.py:157 · Remote installer piped to shelldetail="Instalación tipo 'curl | bash' — ejecuta código remoto sin verificación.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedstack/mcp_audit.py:46 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content("Zero-width Unicode", "[​‌‍⁠]", "high"),Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstack/unified_mcp_server.py:137 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesbackend failure must not kill the whole combined report."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for securitystack-mcp@0.1.0 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

28 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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